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Abstract. The combination of software-as-a-service and the increasing
use of mobile devices gives rise to a considerable difference in compu-
tational power between servers and clients. Thus, there is a desire for
clients to outsource the evaluation of complex functions to a server and
to be able to verify that the resulting value is correct. Previous work in
this area of Publicly Verifiable Outsourced Computation (PVC) requires
a costly pre-processing stage. However, in many practical situations mul-
tiple clients will be interested in the same set of core functions and will
make use of the same servers. Thus, the pre-processing phase may be
performed many more times than is necessary. In this paper we intro-
duce a Key Distribution Center (KDC) that handles the generation and
distribution of the keys that are required to support PVC, thereby elim-
inating this redundancy. We define a number of new security models and
functionalities that arise with the introduction of the KDC, and present
a construction of such a scheme built upon Key-Policy Attribute-based
Encryption.
Keywords— Publicly Verifiable Outsourced Computation, Key Distribution
Center, Key-policy Attribute-based Encryption, Revocation
1 Introduction
It is increasingly common for mobile devices to be used as general computing
devices. There is also an increasing trend towards cloud computing and enor-
mous volumes of data (“big data”) which mean that computations may require
considerable computing resources. In short, there is, increasingly, a discrepancy
between the computing resources of end-user devices and the resources required
to perform complex computations on large datasets. This discrepancy, coupled
with the increasing use of software-as-a-service, means there is a requirement for
a client device to be able to delegate a computation to a server.
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Consider, for example, a company that operates a “bring your own device”
policy, enabling employees to use smartphones and tablets. It may not be possi-
ble for these devices to perform complex computations locally. Instead, a com-
putation is outsourced over some network to a more powerful server (possibly
outside the company, offering software-as-a-service, and hence untrusted) and
the result of the computation is returned to the client device. Another example
scenario arises in the context of battlefield communications where each member
of a squadron of soldiers is deployed with a reasonably light-weight computing
device. The soldiers gather data from their surroundings and send it to regional
servers for analysis before receiving tactical commands based on results. Thus a
soldier must have an assurance that the command has been computed correctly
and by a trusted party. A final example could consider sensor networks where
lightweight sensors transmit readings to a more powerful base station to compute
statistics that can be verified by an experimenter.
In simple terms, given a function F to be computed by a server S, the
client sends input x to S, who should return F (x) to the client. However, there
may be an incentive for the server (or an imposter) to cheat and return an
invalid result y 6= F (x) to the client. The acceptance of an incorrect result may
have an advantage for the server, or the server may be too busy or may not
wish to devote resources to perform the computation. Thus, the client wishes
to have some assurance that the result y returned by the server is, in fact,
F (x). This problem, known as Verifiable Outsourced Computation (VC), has
attracted a lot of attention in the community recently (see Sect. 2 for a brief
overview). Many current schemes have an expensive pre-processing stage run
by the client, which should be amortised over many function evaluations over
distinct inputs. Note, however, it is likely that many different clients will be
interested in outsourcing computations, and also that the functions of interest
to each of the clients will substantially overlap, as in the “bring your own device”
scenario discussed above. It is also conceivable that the number of computation
servers offering to perform such computations will be relatively low (limited to
a reasonably small number of trusted companies with plentiful resources). Thus,
it is easy to envisage a situation in which many computationally limited clients
wish to outsource the computation of the same function F to the same server,
yet each must individually expend considerable resources to run the setup phase.
Our main contribution in this paper is to introduce a Key Distribution Cen-
ter (KDC), that is responsible for running the setup stage on behalf of all clients.
Thus, the expensive algorithm is executed just once and by the more capable
KDC, rather than multiple times by restricted client devices. We consider two
example settings: one is a straightforward generalisation of the previously con-
sidered model where clients send computations directly to an available server; in
the second setting, we allow a pool of computational servers governed by some
managing entity. Clients submit jobs to this pool and the manager distributes
work according to a scheduling policy or a bidding process, and the result is
returned to the client – thus the client may not require knowledge of the server
identity or credentials beforehand.
We give definitions for a new framework of Publicly Verifiable Outsourced
Computation that both removes redundancy and facilitates additional function-
ality (such as revoking misbehaving servers), including several new security no-
tions. We also give a provably secure instantiation that meets the new defini-
tions. In the manager model, we allow for “blind verification” by the manager or
other entities, a form of output privacy, such that he learns whether the result
is valid but not the value of the output. Thus he may reward or punish servers
appropriately without learning function outputs.
It may be tempting to suggest that the KDC, as a trusted entity, performs
all computations itself. However we believe that this is not a practical solution
in many real world scenarios, e.g. the KDC could be an authority within the
organisation responsible for user authorisation that wishes to enable workers to
securely utilise cloud-based software-as-a-service. As an entity within the bound-
aries of the organisation, performing all computations would negate the benefits
gained from outsourcing computations to externally available powerful servers.
Additionally, as an authority on users and keys, the KDC may have simultaneous
responsibilities in other systems, and we minimise its workload to key generation
and revocation only.
2 Verifiable Computation Schemes and Related Work
The concept of non-interactive verifiable computation was introduced by Gen-
naro et al. [4] and may be seen as a protocol between two polynomial-time
parties, a client, C, and a server, S. A successful run of the protocol results in
the provably correct computation of F (x) by the server for an input x supplied
by the client. More specifically, a VC scheme comprises the following steps [4]:
1. KeyGen (Run once): C computes evaluation information EKF that is given
to S to enable it to compute F
2. ProbGen (Run multiple times): C sends the encoded input σx to S
3. Compute (Run multiple times): S computes y = F (x) using EKF and σx
and returns an encoding of the output σy to C
4. Verify (Run multiple times): C checks whether σy encodes F (x)
Parno et al. [8] introduced the idea of Publicly Verifiable Computation (PVC).
In this setting, a single client C1 computes EKF , as well as publishing informa-
tion PKF that enables other clients to encode inputs, meaning that only one
client has to run the expensive pre-processing stage. Each time a client submits
an input x to the server, the client may publish V KF,x, which enables any other
client to verify that the output is correct. A PVC scheme uses the same four algo-
rithms as VC but KeyGen and ProbGen are now required to output public values
that other clients may use to encode inputs and verify outputs, respectively.
PVC using KP-ABE. Parno et al. provide a concrete instantiation using
Key-policy Attribute-based Encryption1 (KP-ABE) [7], for Boolean functions [8].
1 If input privacy is required then a predicate encryption scheme could be used in
place of the KP-ABE scheme.
Table 1: PVC using KP-ABE
Abstract PVC parameter Parameter in KP-ABE instantiation
EKF SKAF
PKF Master public key PP
σx Encryption of m using PP and Ax
σy m or ⊥
V KF,x g(m)
Define a universe U of n attributes and associate V ⊆ U with a binary n-tuple
in which the ith place is 1 if and only if the ith attribute is in V . We call this
the characteristic tuple of V . Thus, there is a natural one-to-one correspondence
between n-tuples and attribute sets; we write Ax to denote the set associated
with x. A function F : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} is monotonic if x 6 y implies F (x) 6
F (y), where x = (x1, . . . , xn) is less than or equal to y = (y1, . . . , yn) if and only
if xi 6 yi for all i. For a monotonic function F, the set {x ∈ {0, 1}
n : F (x) = 1}
defines a monotonic access structure which we denote AF .
The mapping between PVC and KP-ABE parameters are shown in Table 1.
Informally, for a Boolean function F , the client generates a private key SKAF
using the KP-ABE KeyGen algorithm. Given an input x, a client encrypts a ran-
dom message m “with” Ax using the KP-ABE Encrypt algorithm and publishes
V KF,x = g(m) where g is a suitable one-way function (e.g. a hash function). The
server decrypts the message using the KP-ABE Decrypt algorithm, which will
either return m (when F (x) = 1) or ⊥. The server returns m to the client. Any
client can test whether the value returned by the server is equal to g(m). Note,
however, that a “rational” malicious server will always return ⊥, since return-
ing any other value will (with very high probability) result in the verification
algorithm returning a reject decision. Thus, it is necessary to have the server
compute both F and its “complement” (and for both outputs to be verified).
We revisit this point in Appendix A. The interested reader may also consult the
original paper for further details [8]. Note that in order to compute the private
key SKAF , it is necessary to identify all minimal elements x of {0, 1}
n such that
F (x) = 1. There may be exponentially many such x. Thus, the initial phase is
indeed computationally expensive for the client. Note also that the client may
generate different private keys to enable the evaluation of different functions.
Other Related Work. The concept of non-interactive verifiable computation
was formalised by Gennaro et al. [4] who gave a construction using Garbled
Circuits [9] with fully homomorphic encryption [5] to re-randomise the circuit to
allow multiple executions. In independent and concurrent work, Carter et al. [2]
introduce a third party to generate garbled circuits for such schemes but require
this entity to be online throughout and model the system as a secure multi-
party computation between the client, server and third-party. Some works [6,
3] consider the multi-client case where functions are computed over joint input
from multiple clients and notions such as input privacy become more important.
Algorithm
Run by
VC PVC PVC-KDC
KeyGen C1 C1 KDC
ProbGen C1 C1, C2, . . . C1, C2, . . .
Compute S S S1, S2, . . .
Verify C1 C1, C2, . . . C1, C2, . . . or M
KDCS1 S2 S3
PublicC1 C2
EKF,S1 EKF,S2
EKG,S3
σx1 σy1
σx2 σy2
σx3
σy3
V KF,x1
V KF,x2
V KG,x3
Revoke PKF , PKG
Verify
Verify
(a) Standard Model
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Fig. 1: The operation of PVC-KDC
3 PVC with a Key Distribution Center
We now introduce our extension of PVC, which we call Publicly Verifiable Com-
putation with a Key Distribution Center (PVC-KDC). We assume there are
many clients and multiple servers. Different servers may compute the same func-
tion F and servers are “certified” to compute F by the Key Distribution Center.
As we briefly explained in the introduction, there appear to be good reasons
for adopting an architecture of this nature and several scenarios in which such
an architecture would be appropriate. The increasing popularity of relatively
lightweight mobile computing devices in the workplace means that complex com-
putations may best be performed by more powerful servers run by the organi-
zation or in the cloud and we would wish to have some guarantee that those
servers are certified to perform certain functions. It is essential that we can ver-
ify the results of the computation. If cloud services are competing on price to
provide “computation-as-a-service” then it is important that a server cannot ob-
tain an unfair advantage by simply not bothering to compute F (x) and returning
garbage instead. It is also important that a server who is not certified cannot
return a result without being detected. In this paper we focus on two example
system architectures, which we call the Standard Model and the Manager Model:
– The standard model is a natural extension of the PVC architecture with the
addition of a KDC. The entities comprise a set of clients, a set of servers
and a KDC. The KDC initialises the system and generates keys to enable
verifiable computation. Clients submit computation requests to a particular
server and publish some verification information. Any party can verify the
correctness of a server’s output. If the output is incorrect, the client may
report the server to the the KDC for revocation which will prevent the
server from performing any further computations of this function.
– The manager model, in contrast, employs an additional Manager entity who
“owns” a pool of computation servers. Clients submit jobs to the manager,
who will select a server from the pool based on workload scheduling, available
resources or as a result of some bidding process if servers are to be rewarded
per computation. A plausible scenario is that servers enlist with a manager
to “sell” the use of spare resources, whilst clients subscribe to utilise these
through the manager. Results are returned to the manager who should be
able to verify the server’s work. The manager forwards correct results to
the client whilst a misbehaving server may be reported to the KDC for
revocation, and the job assigned to another server. Due to public verifiability,
any party with access to the output and the verification token can also verify
the result. However, in many situations we may not desire external entities
to access the result, yet there remains legitimate reasons for the manager
to perform verification. Thus we introduce “blind verification” such that
the manager (or other entity) may verify the validity of the computation
without learning the output, but the delegating client holds an extra piece
of information that enables the output to be retrieved.
A PVC-KDC system operates as follows, and as shown in Figure 1:
1. The KDC initializes the system and generates public and private parameters,
which are used to generate new keys for many different functions.
2. A server S may join the system by registering with the KDC to receive a
private key SKS .
3. A server S that wishes to provide a computation service for a function F
makes a request to the KDC, who generates a (personalised) secret value
EKF,S and transmits it to S; this will be used in the computation of F (x).
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4. The KDC also generates public data PKF for F , used to encode client inputs,
and publishes a list of servers, LF , that are certified to compute F .
5. To outsource the computation of F (x), a client C uses PKF to prepare σx
and public verification value V KF,x. In the standard model, the client sends
σx to a selected server; in the manager model, σx is sent to a manager who
distributes it to a server according to some policy or bidding process.
6. On receipt of a request to evaluate F (x), (an honest server) S computes the
encoded output σy using EKF,S and σx, publishing or returning σy to C in
the standard model, or to the manager in the manager model.
7. In the standard model, any party, V , can run a verification algorithm using
σy and V KF,x as inputs; the algorithm will output accept and F (x) if and
only if σy encodes F (x). In the manager model, the manager (or other) runs
a blind verification algorithm such that they learn whether the output is
valid, but not the actual value of F (x) – thus the manager learns whether to
reward or request the revocation of the server and may enlist an additional
server if required, but does not learn the (sensitive) result. The delegator
2 Note that for the purposes of revocation EKF,S is associated to a particular server
S and is not public as in previous schemes.
or other chosen verifiers hold additional information that can be used in an
output retrieval algorithm to learn the value of F (x) without having to verify
the result and potentially resubmit. These steps could be run together as in
the standard model, and we collectively call these the verification algorithm.
8. If an invalid result is detected, the verifier or manager reports S by sending
a token τσy to the KDC, who will revoke S. Thus S may incur a financial
penalty from being unable to compute F until the KDC re-certifies him.
3.1 Formal Details
Definition 1. A Publicly Verifiable Outsourced Computation Scheme with Key
Distribution Center (PVC-KDC) comprises the following algorithms:
– Setup(1λ)→ (PP,MK): Run by the KDC to establish public parameters PP
and a master secret key MK.
– FnInit(PP,MK, F ) → (PKF , LF ): Run by the KDC to generate a public
delegation key, PKF , for a function F as well as a list LF of available servers
for evaluating F , which is initially empty.
– Register(PP,MK, S) → SKS: Run by the KDC to generate a personalised
key SKS for a computation server S.
– Certify(PP,MK, F, LF , S) → (EKF,S , LF ): Run by the KDC to generate a
certificate in the form of an evaluation key EKF,S for a function F and
server S. S is added to the list, LF , of available servers for evaluating F .
– ProbGen(x, PKF ) → (σx, V KF,x, b): The ProbGen algorithm is run by a
client to delegate the computation of F (x) to a server. The output value
b is used to enable output retrieval after the blind verification step.
– Compute(σx, EKF,S, SKS) → σy: Run by a server S in possession of an
evaluation key EKF,S , SKS and an encoded input σx of x to evaluate F (x)
and output an encoding, σy , of the result, which includes an identifier of S.
– Verify(PP, σy , V KF,x, LF )→ (y˜, τσy ): Verification consists of two steps.
• BlindVerify(PP, σy , V KF,x, LF ) → (µ, τσy ): Run by any verifying party
party (standard model), or run by the manager (manager model), in
possession of VKF,x and encoded output, σy. This outputs a token τσy =
(accept, S) if the output is valid, or τσy = (reject, S) if S misbehaved. It
also outputs µ which is an encoding of the actual output value.
• RetrieveOutput(µ, τσy , V KF,x, b) → y˜: Run by a verifier in possession of
b to retrieve the actual result y˜ which is either F (x) or ⊥.
– Revoke(MK, τσy , F, LF )→ ({EKF,S′}, LF ) or ⊥: Run by the KDC if a mis-
behaving server is reported i.e. that Verify returned τσy = (reject, S) (if
τσy = (accept, S) then this algorithm should output ⊥). It revokes the evalu-
ation key EKF,S of the server S thereby preventing any further evaluations
of F . This is achieved by removing S from LF (the list of servers for F ) and
issuing updated evaluation keys EKF,S′ to all servers S
′ 6= S.
Definition 2 (Correctness). A Publicly Verifiable Computation Scheme with
a Key Distribution Center (PVC-KDC) is correct for a family of functions F if
for all functions F ∈ F and inputs x,where negl(·) is a negligible function of its
input:
Pr[Setup(1λ)→ (PP,MK),FnInit(PP,MK, F )→ (PKF , LF),
Register(PP,MK, S)→ SKS,Certify(PP,MK, F, LF, S)→ (EKF,S, LF),
ProbGen(x, PKF )→ (σx, V KF,x, b),
Verify(PP,Compute(σx, EKF,S, SKS), V KF,x, LF)→ (F (x), (accept, S))]
= 1− negl(λ).
3.2 Security Models
We now formalise several notions of security as a series of cryptographic games.
The adversary against a particular function F is modelled as a probabilistic
polynomial time algorithm A run by a challenger. The adversary algorithm
may maintain state and be multi-stage and we overload the notation by call-
ing each of these adversary algorithms A. The notation AO is used to denote
the adversary A being provided with oracle access to the following functions:
FnInit(PP,MK, ·),Register(PP,MK, ·), Certify(PP,MK, ·, ·, ·) and Revoke(MK, ·, ·, ·).
In each of the games, we define the advantage and security of A as:
Definition 3. The advantage of an adversary A running in probabilistic polyno-
mial time (PPT), making a polynomial number of queries q is defined as follows,
where X ∈ {PubV erif, Revocation, V indictiveS,BV erif, V indictiveM}:
AdvXA (PVCKDC, F, 1
λ, q) = Pr[ExpXA [PVCKDC, F, 1
λ] = 1].
A PVC-KDC is secure against Game X for a function F , if for all PPT adver-
saries A, AdvXA(PVCKDC, F , 1
λ,q) ≤ negl(λ).
Public Verifiability. In Game 1 we extend the Public Verifiability game of
Parno et al. [8] to formalize that multiple servers should not be able to collude to
convince any verifying party of an incorrect output (i.e. that Verify returns accept
on a σy for y 6= F (x)). The game begins (line 1) with the adversary selecting a
(polynomially sized) set of n input values that he would like to see the problem
encoding of (and the corresponding time period3). The challenger runs Setup,
FnInit and Register to initialise the system and create a public delegation key
for a function F given as a parameter to the game (lines 2 to 4). The adversary
is given the delegation key, his private key and the public parameters (i.e. all
values known to a server in the real setting), and must output a list of servers
that should be certified to compute F (line 6)4.
3 The time period here is changed every time a server is revoked. Alternatively, the
time period could be regularly updated but the Revoke algorithm must be run at
each interval even if the revocation list has not changed.
4 This corresponds to the revocation list in the model of [1] except that we consider
a certification list of servers that should receive the update keys rather than a revo-
Game 1 ExpPubV erifA
[
PVCKDC, F, 1
λ
]
:
1: {t⋆i , x
⋆
i }i∈[n] ← A(1
λ);
2: (PP,MK)← Setup(1λ);
3: (PKF , LF )← FnInit(PP,MK, F );
4: SKA ← Register(PP,MK,A);
5: LF ← A(PKF ,PP, LF , SKA);
6: (EKF,A, LF )← Certify(PP,MK, F, LF ,A);
7: for i = 1 to n do
8: {σx⋆
i
, V KF,x⋆
i
, bi} ← ProbGen({t
⋆
i , x
⋆
i }, PKF );
9: σy⋆ ← AO(PKF ,PP, LF , {σx⋆
i
, V KF,x⋆
i
}, EKF,A, SKA);
10: if ∃i ∈ [n] s.t. (((y˜, τσy⋆ ) ← Verify(PP, σy⋆ , V KF,x⋆i , LF )) and ((y˜, τσy ) 6=
(⊥, (reject,A))) and (y˜ 6= F (x⋆i ))) then
11: return 1
12: else
13: return 0
The challenger then runs ProbGen for each challenge input and gives the
encoded inputs to the adversary. The adversary also has oracle access to model
the corruption of other servers (line 10), and aims to create an encoded output
that is accepted by the challenger yet is not valid for any challenge input.
Revocation. In Game 2 we require that if a server is detected as misbehaving
(i.e. Verify outputs (⊥, (reject, S))) then any subsequent evaluations of F by S
should be rejected. Even though we have outsourced the costly computation
and pre-processing stages to the server and KDC respectively, there is still a
cost involved in delegating and verifying a computation. If a server is known not
to be trustworthy then we remove any incentive for it to attempt to provide an
outsourcing service (since it knows the result will not be accepted). In addition,
we may like to punish malicious servers by removing their ability to perform work
(and earn rewards) for a period of time. Finally, from a privacy perspective,
we may not wish to supply input data to a server that is known not to be
trustworthy. In this game the adversary chooses the target input values as before
(line 1) but now the evaluation key EKF,A that it had access to when selecting x
is revoked (line 8) before the computation is run. We require that the adversary
is no longer able to provide any result that verifies correctly (even F (x)).
Vindictive Servers. The motivation for this notion of security is the manager
model where the client does not know the identities of servers selected from the
pool. Now, since an invalid result can lead to revocation, this leads to a new
threat model (particularly in systems where servers gain rewards per compu-
tation performed) in which a malicious server may return incorrect results but
attribute them to an alternate server ID such that the (honest) server is revoked,
cation list of servers that should not receive these keys. The requirement to output
this list here is due to the selective IND-sHRSS game that we base the construction
upon. Since this is used in a black-box manner however, a stronger primitive may
allow this game to be improved accordingly.
Game 2 ExpRevocationA
[
PVCKDC, F, 1
λ
]
:
1: {t⋆i , x
⋆
i }i∈[n] ← A(1
λ);
2: (PP,MK)← Setup(1λ);
3: (PKF , LF )← FnInit(PP,MK, F );
4: SKA ← Register(PP,MK,A);
5: LF ← A(PKF ,PP, LF , SKA);
6: (EKF,A, LF )← Certify(PP,MK, F, LF ,A);
7: τ⋆ = (reject,A)← AO(PKF ,PP, LF , SKA);
8: ({EKF,S}, LF )← Revoke(MK, τ⋆, F, LF );
9: for i = 1 to n do
10: {σx⋆
i
, V KF,x⋆
i
, bi} ← ProbGen({t⋆i , x
⋆
i }, PKF );
11: σy⋆ ← AO(PKF ,PP, LF , {σx⋆
i
, V KF,x⋆
i
}, {EKF,S}, SKA);
12: if ∃i ∈ [n] s.t. (((y˜, τσy⋆ ) ← Verify(PP, σy⋆ , V KF,x⋆i , LF )) and ((y˜, τσy ) 6=
(⊥, (reject,A)))) then
13: return 1
14: else
15: return 0
Game 3 ExpV indictiveSA
[
PVCKDC, F, 1
λ
]
:
1: {t⋆i , x
⋆
i }i∈[n] ← A(1
λ);
2: (PP,MK)← Setup(1λ);
3: (PKF , LF )← FnInit(PP,MK, F );
4: SKA ← Register(PP,MK,A);
5: LF ← A(PKF ,PP, LF , SKA);
6: (EKF,A, LF )← Certify(PP,MK, F, LF ,A);
7: for i = 1 to n do
8: {σx⋆
i
, V KF,x⋆
i
, bi} ← ProbGen({t⋆i , x
⋆
i }, PKF );
9: S˜ ← AO(PKF ,PP, LF , {(σx⋆
i
, V KF,x⋆
i
)}, EKF,A, SKA) subject to Condition 1;
10: σy⋆ ← AO,Compute(PKF ,PP, LF , {(σx⋆
i
, V KF,x⋆
i
)}, EKF,A, SKA) subject to Condition 2;
11: if ∃i ∈ [n] s.t. ((y˜, τσy⋆ ) ← Verify(PP, σy⋆ , V KF,x⋆i , LF )) and ((y˜, τσy ) =
(⊥, (reject, S˜))) and (⊥8 Revoke(MK, τσy , F, LF ))) then
12: return 1
13: else
14: return 0
thus reducing the size of the server pool and increasing the future reward for the
malicious server. In Game 3 the adversary must (on lines 9 and 10) output an
invalid result σy⋆ and the ID of a server S˜ that it aims to cause to be revoked. It
is provided with the standard oracle access on line 9 and on line 10 additionally
with oracle access to Compute such that he can see outputs returned by hon-
est servers (i.e. modelling the adversary submitting computation requests to the
system himself), subject to the following constraints:
1. No query was made of the form ORegister(PP,MK, S˜);
2. As above but also no query was made of the formOCompute(σx⋆
i
, EKF,S˜, SKS˜);
The adversary wins if the KDC believes that S˜ returned y˜ and revokes S˜.
Vindictive Manager and Blind Verification. In Appendix B we give two
more security games for the manager model, namely the notions of Vindictive
Managers and Blind Verification. Vindictive Managers captures that a manager,
being an intermediary in the verification process, may try to accept an incorrect
answer in order to convince the client (or other recipient) of incorrect results
– in a simple case, a vindictive manager could simply return the value of the
“result” to the client. In the game, we provide the adversary with an encoded
output, and require him to output an incorrect result, µ, with an acceptance
token which will be accepted by a verifier in VC.RetrieveOutput. Thus, the goal
is essentially to forge an encoded output µ.
The Blind Verification game captures a (weak) notion of output privacy in
that it prevents verifiers from learning the output unless they hold an additional
key, b. It does not prevent the servers themselves learning the output during
Compute as usually considered output privacy. The challenger selects a random
input x and gives the adversary the encoded output of the computation. The
adversary must guess F (x).
4 Construction
We provide a full construction of PVC-KDC using revocable KP-ABE in Ap-
pendix A. Informally, the scheme operates in the following way.
1. VC.Setup establishes public parameters and a master secret key by calling
the ABE.Setup algorithm twice. In the manager model, we would require
these algorithms to be run over the same set of random coins when choosing
random exponents for attribute group elements such that the set of values
for U is the same in both cases, even if the associated semantic meaning
differs. Thus, an adversary cannot recognize which set of parameters a given
ciphertext belongs to, and hence cannot break the blind verification property.
This algorithm also initializes a list of registered servers LReg and a time
source τ5.
2. VC.FnInit initializes a list of servers LF authorized to compute function F .
3. VC.Register creates a public-private key pair by calling the signature KeyGen
algorithm. This is run by the KDC (or the manager in the manager model)
and updates LReg to include S.
4. VC.Certify creates the key EKF,S that will be used by a server S to compute
F by calling the ABE.KeyGen and ABE.KeyUpdate algorithms twice – once
with a “policy” for F and once with the complement F . The algorithm also
updates LF to include S.
5. VC.ProbGen creates a problem instance σx = (c0, c1) by encrypting two ran-
domly chosen messages, and a verification key V KF,x by applying a pre-
image resistant hash function g to the messages. The ciphertexts and ver-
ification tokens are ordered randomly according to a bit b, such that the
positioning of an element does not imply whether it relates to F or for F .
6. VC.Compute is run by a server S and computes F (x). Given a problem
instance σx = (c0, c1) it returns (m0,⊥) if F (x) = 1 or (⊥,m1) if F (x) =
5 τ could be a counter that is maintained in the public parameters or a networked
clock.
0, ordered according to b chosen in VC.ProbGen, together with a digital
signature computed over the output. The server can determine the value of
b based on the results of decryptions with the different ABE parameters, and
order his output correspondingly.
7. VC.Verify either accepts the output σy = (d0, d1) or rejects it. This algorithm
verifies the signature on the output and then confirms the output is correct
by applying g and comparing with V KF,x. In VC.BlindVerify the verifier can
compare pairwise between the components of σy and V KF,x to determine
correctness but as they are unaware of the value of b, they do not know
the order of these elements and therefore do not learn whether the correct
output corresponds to F or F being satisfied i.e. if F (x) = 1 or 0 respectively.
The verifier outputs an accept or reject token as well as the satisfying (non-
⊥) output value µ ∈ {db, d1−b}. In VC.RetrieveOutput a verifier that has
knowledge of b can check whether the output from BlindVerify matches m0
or m1.
8. VC.Revoke is run by the KDC and redistributes fresh keys to all non-revoked
servers. This algorithm updates LF and updates EKF,S using the results of
two calls to the ABE.KeyUpdate algorithm.
Theorem 1. Given a secure revocable KP-ABE scheme in the sense of in-
distinguishability against selective-target with semi-static query attack ( IND-
sHRSS) [1] for a class of functions F closed under complement, a signature
scheme secure against EUF-CMA and a pre-image resistant hash function g,
let VC be the verifiable computation scheme defined in Algorithms 1–9. Then
VC is secure in the sense of Public Verifiability, Revocation, Vindictive Servers,
Blind Verification and Vindictive Managers.
Informally, the proofs of Public Verifiability and against Vindictive Managers
rely on the IND-CPA security of the underlying revocable KP-ABE scheme
and the pre-image resistance of the function g. Revocation relies on the IND-
sHRSS security of the revocable KP-ABE scheme. Blind Verification relies on
the indistinguishability of two random messages, and the pre-image resistance
of g. These proofs are left for the full version of the paper. Now we present a
proof sketch for the security against vindictive servers.
Proof (Sketch). Let AV C be an adversary with non-negligible advantage against
the Vindictive Servers game (Game 3). We construct an adversary ASig with
non-negligble advantage δ in the EUF-CMA signatures game using AV C . ASig
interacts with the challenger C in the EUF-CMA security game and acts as the
challenger for AV C in the security game for Vindictive Servers for a function
F . Here the idea is that ASig can create a VC instance and play the Vindictive
Servers game with AV C by executing Algorithms 1–9 himself. ASig will guess
a server identity that he thinks the adversary will select to vindictively revoke.
The signature signing key that would be generated during the Register algorithm
for this server will be implicitly set to be the signing key in the EUF-CMA
game and any Compute oracle queries for this identity will be forwarded to the
challenger to compute. Then, assuming that ASig guessed the correct server
identity, AV C will output a forged signature that ASig may output as its guess
in the EUF-CMA game. If ASig guessed the challenge identity correctly (i.e.
S = S˜) then ASig succeeds with the same non-negligible advantage δ as AV C .
Let n = |Uid|, then the probability that ASig correctly guesses S = S˜ is
1
n
and
AdvASig ≥
1
n
AdvAV C ≥
δ
n
≥ negl(λ). Thus we conclude that ASig has a non-
negligible advantage against the EUF-CMA game if AV C has a non-negligible
advantage in the Vindictive Servers game, but as we assume the signature scheme
in our construction to be EUF-CMA secure, such an adversary may not exist.
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A Construction
We now provide an instantiation of a PVC-KDC scheme. Our construction is
based on that used by Parno et al. [8] (summarised in Sec. 2) which uses Key-
Policy Attribute-based Encryption (KP-ABE) in a black-box manner to out-
source the computation of a Boolean function6. Notice that to achieve the out-
sourced evaluation of functions with n bit outputs, it is possible to evaluate
6 Following Parno et al. we restrict our attention to Boolean functions, and in par-
ticular the complexity class NC1 which includes all circuits of depth O(log n). This
class includes common functions of interest such as AND, OR, NOT, equality and
comparison operators, arithmetic operators and regular expressions.
n different functions, each of which applies a mask to output the single bit in
position i.
Recall that if ⊥ is returned by the server then the verifier is unable to deter-
mine whether F (x) = 0 or whether the server misbehaved. To avoid this issue,
we follow Parno et al. and restrict the family of functions F we can evaluate
to be the set of Boolean functions closed under complement. That is, if F be-
longs to F then F , where F (x) = F (x) ⊕ 1, also belongs to F . Then, the client
encrypts two random messages m0 and m1. The server is required to return
the decryption of those ciphertexts. Thus, a well-formed response satisfies the
following:
(d0, d1) =
{
(m0,⊥), if F (x) = 1;
(⊥,m1), if F (x) = 0.
Hence, the client will be able to detect whether the server has misbehaved. We as-
sume the existence of a revocable KP-ABE scheme for a class of functions F that
is closed under complement. Such a scheme defines the algorithms ABE.Setup,
ABE.KeyGen, ABE.KeyUpdate, ABE.Encrypt and ABE.Decrypt. We also make use
of a signature scheme with algorithms Sig.KeyGen, Sig.Sign and Sig.Verify and a
pre-image resistant hash function g.
Then we construct a publicly verifiable computation scheme for the same
class of functions comprising the algorithms VC.Setup, VC.FnInit, VC.Register,
VC.Certify, VC.ProbGen, VC.Compute, VC.Verify and VC.Revoke). More formally,
our scheme is defined by Algorithms 1–9.
Algorithm 1 VC.Setup
1: Let U = Uattr ∪ UID ∪ Utime
2: (MPK0ABE,MSK
0
ABE)← ABE.Setup(1
λ,U)
3: (MPK1ABE,MPK
1
ABE)← ABE.Setup(1
λ,U)
4: LReg = ǫ (i.e. an empty list is created)
5: Initialize τ
6: PP = (MPK0ABE,MPK
1
ABE, LReg, t)
7: MK = (MSK0ABE,MSK
1
ABE)
Algorithm 2 VC.FnInit
1: Set PKF = PP
2: Set LF = ǫ (i.e. an empty list is created).
Algorithm 3 VC.Register
1: (SKSig, V KSig)← Sig.KeyGen(1λ)
2: SKS = SKSig
3: LReg = LReg ∪ (S, V KSig)
Algorithm 4 VC.Certify
1: t← τ
2: SK0ABE ← ABE.KeyGen(S, F,MSK
0
ABE,MPK
0
ABE)
3: SK1ABE ← ABE.KeyGen(S, F ,MSK
1
ABE,MPK
1
ABE)
4: UK0
LF ,t
← ABE.KeyUpdate(LF, t,MSK
0
ABE,MPK
0
ABE)
5: UK1LF ,t ← ABE.KeyUpdate(LF, t,MSK
1
ABE,MPK
1
ABE)
6: Output: EKF,S = (SK0ABE, SK
1
ABE, UK
0
LF ,t
, UK1
LF ,t
) and LF = LF ∪ S
Algorithm 5 VC.ProbGen
1: t← τ
2: (m0, m1)
$
←M×M
3: b
$
← {0, 1}
4: cb ← ABE.Encrypt(t, x,mb,MPK0ABE)
5: c1−b ← ABE.Encrypt(t, x,m1−b,MPK1ABE)
6: Output: σx = (cb, c1−b) and V KF,x = (g(mb), g(m1−b), LReg)
Algorithm 6 VC.Compute
1: Input: EKF,S = (SK0ABE, SK
1
ABE, UK
0
LF ,t
, UK1
LF ,t
) and σx = (cb, c1−b)
2: Parse σx as (c, c′)
3: d0 ← ABE.Decrypt(c, SK0ABE,MPK
0
ABE, UK
0
LF ,t
)
4: d1 ← ABE.Decrypt(c′, SK1ABE,MPK
1
ABE, UK
1
LF ,t
)
5: if d0 6=⊥ or d1 6=⊥ then
6: b=0
7: else
8: b=1
9: d0 ← ABE.Decrypt(c, SK1ABE,MPK
1
ABE, UK
1
LF ,t
)
10: d1 ← ABE.Decrypt(c′, SK0ABE,MPK
0
ABE, UK
0
LF ,t
)
11: γ ← Sig.Sign((db, d1−b, S), SKS)
12: Output: σy = (db, d1−b, S, γ)
Algorithm 7 VC.BlindVerify
1: Input: VKF,x = (g(mb), g(m1−b), LReg) and σy = (db, d1−b, S, γ)
2: if S ∈ LF and (S, V KSig) ∈ LReg then
3: if Sig.Verify((db, d1−b, S), γ, V KSig)→ accept then
4: if g(mb) = g(db) then
5: Output (µ = db, τσy = (accept, S))
6: else if g(m1−b) = g(d1−b) then
7: Output (µ = d1−b, τσy = (accept, S))
8: else
9: Output (µ =⊥, τσy = (reject, S))
10: Output (µ =⊥, τσy = (reject,⊥))
Algorithm 8 VC.RetrieveOutput
1: Input: V KF,x = (g(mb), g(m1−b), LReg), σy = (db, d1−b, S, γ), b, and (µ, τσy ) where µ ∈
{db, d1−b,⊥}
2: if τσy = (accept, S) and g(µ) = g(m0) then
3: Output y˜ = 1
4: else if τσy = (accept, S) and g(µ) = g(m1) then
5: Output y˜ = 0
6: else
7: Output y˜ =⊥
Algorithm 9 VC.Revoke
1: if τσy = (reject, S) then
2: LF = LF \ S
3: Refresha τ
4: t← τ
5: UK0LF ,t ← ABE.KeyUpdate(LF, t,MSK
0
ABE,MPK
0
ABE)
6: UK1
LF ,t
← ABE.KeyUpdate(LF, t,MSK
1
ABE,MPK
1
ABE)
7: for all S′ ∈ LF, S′ 6= S do
8: Parse EKF,S′ as (SK
0
ABE, SK
1
ABE, UK
0
LF ,t−1
, UK1LF ,t−1
)
9: Update and send EKF,S′ = (SK0ABE, SK
1
ABE, UK
0
LF ,t
, UK1
LF ,t
).
10: else
11: output ⊥
a By refresh we mean, for example, increment τ if it is a counter
B Security Games
Game 4 ExpV indictiveMA
[
PVCKDC, F, 1
λ
]
:
1: (PP,MK)← Setup(1λ);
2: (PKF , LF )← FnInit(PP,MK, F );
3: SKS ← Register(PP,MK, S);
4: (EKF,S, LF )← Certify(PP,MK, F, LF , S);
5: (t⋆, x⋆)← AO(PKF , LF ,PP);
6: (σx⋆ , V KF,x⋆ , b)← ProbGen((t⋆ , x⋆), PKF );
7: σy ← Compute(σx⋆ , EKF,S, SKS);
8: (µ, τσy )← A
O(PP, σy , V KF,x⋆ , PKF , LF );
9: y˜ ← RetrieveOutput(µ, τσy , V KF,x⋆ , b));
10: if (y˜ 6= F (x⋆)) and (y˜ 6=⊥) then
11: return 1
12: else
13: return 0
Game 5 ExpBV erifA
[
PVCKDC, F, 1
λ
]
:
1: (PP,MK)← Setup(1λ);
2: (PKF , LF )← FnInit(PP,MK, F );
3: SKS ← Register(PP,MK, S);
4: (EKF,S, LF )← Certify(PP,MK, F, LF , S);
5: x
$
← Dom(F );
6: t
$
← τ ;
7: (σx, V KF,x, b)← ProbGen((t, x), PKF );
8: σy ← Compute(σx, EKF,S, SKS);
9: bˆ← AO(σy , V KF,x,PP, PKF , LF ));
10: if bˆ = F (x) then
11: return 1
12: else
13: return 0
Vindictive Manager. In Game 4 we capture security against vindictive man-
agers attempting to provide the client with an incorrect answer, as discussed in
Section 3.2. This is a natural extension of the Public Verifiability notion (Game
1) in the manager model. The adversary, on line 5, chooses a challenge input
value x, and the server computes an encoded output of F (x). The adversary
is then provided the encoded output and verification key and must output an
encoded output µ and an acceptance token. The challenger runs RetrieveOutput
on µ to get an output value y˜, and the adversary wins if the challenger accepts
this output and y˜ 6= F (x). We remark that manager model instantiations may
vary depending on the level of trust given to the manager. A completely trusted
manager may simply return the result to a client, whilst a completely untrusted
manager may have to provide the full output from the server and the client
performs the full Verify step as well (in this case, security against vindictive
managers will reduce to Public Verifiability since the manager would need to
forge a full encoded output that passes a full verification step). Here we consider
a middle ground where the manager is semi-trusted but the clients would still
like a final, efficient check.
Blind Verification. With Game 5, we aim to show that a verifier that does not
know the value of b chosen in ProbGen cannot learn the value of F (x) given the
encoded output. The challenger chooses an input value, x, at random from the
domain of F and a time period, and uses these to generate an encoded input. He
runs Compute on this input and gives the encoded output and the verification
key to the adversary who must output a guess for the value of F (x). We require
that A does not make a query to the Certify oracle for the function F else he
may use trial decryptions to compute b, and may not submit x to the ProbGen
oracle. Similarly, A may not use the Compute oracle for σx, but we assume he
does not get this value and by the IND-CPA property of the ABE scheme we
use, he may not guess a valid ciphertext for x.
